Chinese Food Security: Debate Over Brown Highlights Anxieties

A report from U.S. Embassy Beijing November 1996

Summary: Chinese food security issues examined in íscience and technology for a prosperous Chinaí and the strong reaction in China to Lester Brownís "Who Will Feed China?" highlight constraints on increased food production and anxieties about Chinaís food security. In Embassyís view, market forces will shape food production and consumption patterns in such a way that brownís pessimism will prove unwarranted. Chinaís impact on world grain price swings arises from a lack of information and planning for Chinese grain demand rather than any shortfall in world grain production capacity. End summary.

Lester Brown Rings the Alarm

Constraints on China's ability to increase agricultural production to feed its population, expected to peak at 1.6 billion people in the year 2030, are examined in the food security section of "Science and Education for A Prosperous China" . Lester Brown, in his article "Who will feed China?" warns that China will in the coming decades have great difficulty feeding its own population. Brown predicts future large Chinese food production shortfalls, very large Chinese grain imports that swamp the world grain market, and ensuing food shortages in impoverished developing countries. Although the food security section of "Science and Education for A Prosperous China" largely accepts Brownís views on Chinaís food security challenges, Brown's views have been questioned by many agricultural experts in China and elsewhere. Brownian alarmists might point out that Chinese meat consumption, up 12 percent during 1995, rose much faster than general food consumption up only 4.5 percent. The alarmists would see this as evidence that the Chinese diet is shifting towards more meat. This in turn boosts grain consumption since four kilograms of grain are needed to produce one kilogram of meat. Rising meat consumption reflects higher incomes.

Chinese Views of Lester Brown's Thesis

Lester Brownís thesis has gotten mixed reviews in both China and in other countries. Mass media examinations of Brown's "Who will feed China?" arguments, often featuring panels of Chinese agricultural experts, unanimously reject the Brown thesis, but the authors of "Science and Education for A Prosperous China" largely accept the Brown thesis. Mass media arguments of Brownís thesis often have nationalist overtones -- critics sometimes wonder aloud why a foreigner would ask ísuch an insulting questioní. A relatively balanced view of Brownís thesis in the September 1996 bestseller appears in "Will Famine Once Again Knock at Chinaís Door? -- A Wake Up Call for the World" (jiíe hui chongxin kouxiang zhongguode damen ma -- xingshi huhuan) written by two Xinhua Press Agency journalists and a panel of specialists. The authors thank Brown for his valuable and timely warning, and conclude that due attention to improving agricultural production combined with a suitable level of imports will solve Chinaís twenty-first century food problem.

State Council White Paper -- "The Grain Issue in China"

On October 26 the State Council issued a white paper that states China will certainly be able to feed itself. The English text of the State Council Information Office white paper "The Grain Issue in China" appears in the November 11, 1996 issue of Beijing Review on pp. 15 - 24. The State Council white paper sets a target for China of 95 percent grain self-sufficiency íunder normal conditionsí. According to the White Paper, China will make up for farm land lost to urbanization by reclaiming 300,000 hectares of wasteland each year. Twenty million tons of grain can be saved by improvements in grain planting, harvesting, storage and transportation. According to the White Paper, Chinese grain imports over the last decade have steadily declined as a percentage of Chinese domestic grain production from 3.2 percent in 1978 - 1984 to just 0.3 percent from 1991 to 1995. Thus, says the White Paper, "the small quantity of grain imported by China will not imperil the stability of the international grain market".

Deep Chinese anxieties about food security seem to keep the "Who will Feed China?" controversy alive despite the refutation (over and over again since the issue pops up every few months) of the Brown thesis by panels of experts in the Chinese press.

Role Of Market Forces In Shaping Food Consumption Patterns

The alarmist view of Chinaís food security problem puts altogether too much faith in linear extrapolations and ignores the play of market forces. For example, Chinese domestic food prices, which rose by 48 percent during 1994 and 37 percent during 1995, are now over twice as high as they were in April 1993. For the first time since the early 1950s, Chinese domestic food prices are near or above the world market price. Looking at meat consumption, large percentage increases in Chinese meat consumption show up because the figures are increasing from a relatively low consumption baseline. In addition, if meat consumption increases begin to outstrip supply prices will rise and Chinese consumers may choose to eat less meat.

Chinese Food Imports And World Market Prices

The shock effect of Chinese imports on the world market results from a lack of information about Chinese grain purchase needs and plans rather than any shortfall in world grain production capacity. Chinese reluctance to share crop data makes it harder for foreign farmers to boost production beforehand to anticipate increased Chinese demand. During 1995 the Chinese government halted rapid food price inflation by sharply restricting food exports, encouraging food imports (bringing total net imports up to 15 million tons for the year 1995), and increasing the area sown in grain by one million hectares. Since by 1995 food stocks had dropped to their lowest point in five years, China could not use the release of food stocks as a tool for controlling food price inflation. Today China can meet most of its grain needs in a good year but must import 12 - 14 million metric tons of grain in a bad year in order to prevent a food shortage.

Factors Limiting Increased Agricultural Production

Experts agree that Chinaís lack of an adequate water supply is the single greatest constraint on Chinaís ability to increase its agricultural production. Another limiting factor is the low government fixed price paid to farmers for about one-third of Chinaís agricultural production. Eliminating the artificially low government price that Chinese farmers receive for one-third of all Chinese food production would increase the incentive to produce and boost rural incomes.

This report, co-authored by the U.S. Embassy Beijing Environment, Science and Technology section and the Agriculture Section, comments on the food security section of "Science and Education for A Prosperous China".

"Science and Education for a Prosperous China" Series

"Science and Education for a Prosperous China" written by the State Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) (overview) elaborates on the national science policy propounded in the CPC Central Committee and State Council "Decision on Accelerating the Progress of Science and Technology" and in speeches by President Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng Chinese S&T Policy: A View From the Top . Reports in this series summarize and comment at greater length this 400 page document written for Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and Chinese government officials. The reports summarize and analyze the economic, food security (including the Lester Brown "Who Will Feed China?" controversy and Chinese Critics Confront Lester Brown) , the challenges of absorbing and creating technology and military aspects of the new Chinese S&T policy which emerged from the May 1995 conference. The reports also summarize and analyze the environmental portion of the SSTC volume. The SSTC volume examines S&T lessons China can draw from the S&T policies of other countries as well as lessons China draws from its own S&T experience since 1949. The report Chinese S&T and the Challenge of WTO Accession reviews the effect of S&T on the risks and rewards China will encounter when it joins the WTO.